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Introduction
Thirty years a!er the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU)1 grappled with the first cases, positive action 
remains a controversial issue of EU law. Numerous theoretical contributions have been written on the 
topic and the notion is by now well-known, at least from a theoretical perspective. Hence, the aim of 
the present article is not to propose a conceptual discussion of positive action, but rather to explore 
the ways in which it has been used and operationalised in practice. Based on recent legal and case law 
developments at EU level and in Member States, we examine the question of whether, and when, positive 
action truly promotes substantive equality in practice. By the same token, we look at the application 
of the notion through a critical lens and ask whether its misuse does not, at times, curb the principle 
of equality itself. A!er briefly defining the notion of positive action and offering some terminological 
clarifications (I), we briefly trace its legal development in EU law from historical landmark cases to more 
recent developments at the CJEU (II). In a third section, we explore and discuss the potentialities and 
pitfalls of positive action through examples from its different fields of application in a number of EU 
Member States (III). Finally, we further investigate the difficulties posed by the notion in practice through 
a detailed analysis of the French case law (IV). To conclude, we propose some lessons and reflections on 
the dos and don’ts of positive action (V).
I From formal to substantive equality?
A controversial and polysemous concept
Positive action is by now a well-known concept which has attracted the attention of a considerable 
amount of institutional and academic research.2 In contrast to formal equality, which merely focuses on 
* Raphaële Xenidis is a postdoctoral researcher in EU gender equality law at Utrecht University Department of International 
and European Law and researcher at the European Network of legal experts in gender equality and non-discrimination.
 Hélène Masse-Dessen is Honorary Barrister at the French Conseil d’Etat and Cour de cassation and the French national 
expert on gender equality law at the European Network of legal experts in gender equality and non-discrimination.
 The authors would like to thank Susanne Burri, Franka van Hoof and Alexandra Timmer for their comments and support.
1 Throughout this article, we use the term CJEU for the sake of uniformity even though prior to 2009 the Court was in fact 
Court of Justice of the European Communities (CJEC).
2 See e.g. De Vos, M. (2007), Beyond formal equality: Positive action under Directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC, European 
Commission, LuxembourgLuxembourg, 2007; Selanec, G. and Senden, L. (2011), Positive action measures to ensure full 
equality in practice between men and women, including on company boards, European Commission, Brussels; Equinet (2014), 
Positive action measures. The experience of equality bodies, Brussels. See also e.g. O’Cinneide, C. (2005), ‘Positive duties and 
gender equality’, International Journal of Discrimination and the Law, Vol. 8, p. 91; O’Cinneide, C. (2006), ‘Positive action and 
the limits of existing law’ Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, Vol. 13, p. 351; Fredman, S. (1998), ‘After 
Kalanke and Marschall: Affirming affirmative action’ Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, Vol. 1, p. 199; Fredman, 
S. ‘Affirmative action and the European Court of Justice: A Critical Analysis’ in Shaw, J. (ed) (2000), Social law and policy in 
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providing every individual or group with the same opportunities and chances, positive action aims at social 
transformation and de facto equality. It covers a broad range of measures, the objective of which is, in 
the short or long term, directly or indirectly, to tend towards an equality of results. By definition, positive 
action relates to ‘differential treatment designed to ameliorate disadvantage or address specific need’.3 
Positive action measures are by essence redistributive as they seek to alter the unequal distribution of 
social goods of all kinds (labour, political participation opportunities, education, etc.) among different 
groups in society, and in fine the representation and inclusion of these groups. In the face of persisting 
inequalities and the limited capacities of an individual adversarial anti-discrimination judicial framework, 
positive action has been called on to provide a more systematic and upstream equality model.4 What is 
more, today, measures encouraging diversity are not only regarded as a matter of equality and fairness, 
but also increasingly as an efficiency issue (e.g. in terms of managing human resources, producing 
output, etc.).5
To place positive action within a broader conceptual framework, it can be called a form of ‘asymmetrical’ 
equality.6 Rather than treating comparable cases in the same manner, which is the mantra of formal 
equality, positive and affirmative action evolve on a spectrum ranging from real equal opportunities to 
substantive and transformative equality. They either seek to truly equalise chances of social participation 
for disadvantaged groups, or even target an equality of results termed ‘substantive’.7 At the same time, 
when they seek to remedy past discrimination, challenge established stereotypes and ‘modify […] social 
and cultural patterns of conduct’ to ‘eliminat[e] prejudices […] and all other practices which are based on 
the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes’, they come under the ambit of what is 
now called ‘transformative equality’.8
Despite these recognised benefits, positive action remains controversial because of its declared lack 
of ‘neutrality’. It goes beyond the widely accepted formal equality formula of ‘treating like cases as 
like’ and speaks to the second, less-known, part of Aristotle’s principle of justice by treating unlike 
cases differently. In lay terms, however, positive action is o!en assimilated to a kind of unconditional 
favouritism granted to certain individuals merely because of their membership of socially disadvantaged 
groups. This erroneous association has contributed to imbuing the notion with a controversial reputation.
an evolving European Union (1st edition), Hart Publishing); Fredman, S. (2009), Human rights transformed: positive rights and 
positive duties, Oxford University Press, Chapter 8; McCrudden, C. (1986) ‘Rethinking positive action’ Industrial Law Journal, 
Vol. 15, p. 219; Waddington, L. (2011), ‘Exploring the boundaries of positive action under EU law: A search for conceptual 
clarity’, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 48, p. 1503.
3 McColgan, A. (2014), Discrimination, equality and the law, Human Rights Law in Perspective, Vol. 19, Hart Publishing, p. 89. 
See also Barmes, L. (2009), ‘Equality law and experimentation: The positive action challenge’, The Cambridge Law Journal, 
Vol. 68, p. 623.
4 Fredman, Human rights transformed positive rights and positive duties (Chapter 8).
5 See Council of the European Union, Council recommendation 84/635/EEC of 13 December 1984 on the promotion of 
positive action for women (1984) OJ L331/34. See also Craig, P. P. and De Búrca, G. (2015), EU law: text, cases, and materials, 
(Sixth edition), Oxford University Press, pp. 951-955.
6 McColgan, Discrimination, equality and the lawequality and the law, pp. 70-100 and Fredman, S. (2016), ‘Substantive 
equality revisited’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 14, pp. 712, 728/729.
7 For an interesting discussion of the concept of substantive equality, see for instance the debate between European and 
US scholars Sandra Fredman and Catharine MacKinnon: Fredman, S. (2016), ‘Substantive equality revisited’, International 
Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 14, p. 712; Fredman, S. (2016), ‘Substantive equality revisited: A rejoinder to Catharine 
MacKinnon’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 14, p. 747; MacKinnon, C. A. (2016), ‘Substantive equality 
revisited: A reply to Sandra Fredman’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 14, p. 739.
8 Article 5 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, available at http://www.
un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm#article5 accessed on 26 September 2018. See also General 
recommendation No. 25, on Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, on temporary special measures (2004), para. 10 available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/
cedaw/recommendations/General%20recommendation%2025%20(English).pdf accessed on 26 September 2018. On 
the concept of transformative equality more specifically, see e.g. Fredman, S. (2003), ‘Beyond the dichotomy of formal 
and substantive equality: Towards a new definition of equal rights’ in Boerefijn, I. et al (eds), Temporary special measures: 
accelerating de facto equality of women under Article 4(1) UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, Intersentia; Holtmaat, R. (2012), ‘Article 5’ in Rudolf, B., Freeman, M. A. and Chinkin, C. M. (eds), The UN 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women: a commentary,Oxford University Press, pp. 143-
144; Cusack, S. and Pusey, L. (2013), ‘CEDAW and the rights to non-discrimination and equality’, Melbourne Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 14, p. 54, p. 11-12.
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A broad spectrum
At the level of terminology, concepts have frequently been mixed up, adding to the existing confusion. Even 
though o!en assimilated to ‘reverse’ or ‘positive discrimination’, positive action is legally distinguishable. 
While ‘reverse’ and ‘positive’ discrimination refer to direct preferences given to certain groups because 
of their social membership, positive action is much broader as it covers a wide spectrum of possible 
measures ranging from monitoring and indirect support to more direct interventions such as quotas. The 
existing conceptual plurality is reinforced by the different terminology used in other jurisdictions. The 
European notion of ‘positive action’ is, for instance, to be distinguished from its US counterpart. While 
‘affirmative action’ is broadly similar, it also carries its own history and socio-legal context and functions 
along different parameters.9 
As mentioned above, the term positive action embodies a wide spectrum of meanings and encompasses 
measures of different levels of intensity.10 As early as 1986, Christopher McCrudden proposed a five-
pronged classification of possible types of positive action: (1) the review of policies and actions in light 
of the discriminatory impact they can have and the eradication of discrimination – now o!en referred 
to as gender mainstreaming; (2) a form of objectively justified indirect discrimination through targeted 
‘inclusionary’ policies aimed at increasing the representation of socially disadvantaged groups but using 
neutral criteria such as unemployed status or residential area; (3) ‘outreach programmes’ providing 
information, support and training to under-represented groups to increase their access to socially 
valued goods (e.g. jobs, political functions, study programme etc.); (4) ‘preferential treatment’ granting 
conditional or unconditional preference11 to under-represented groups in areas such as employment, 
education, services, etc.; and finally (5) the redefinition of ‘merit’ taking into account membership of 
under-represented categories as an asset.12
In the specific context of EU gender equality law, three categories of positive action have been proposed 
with different purposes.13 These aim to increase women’s access to the labour market; improve work-
life balance, achieve a fairer sharing of breadwinning and care responsibilities among women and men, 
and loosen the yoke of traditional gender roles; and finally remedy past discrimination by enhancing the 
representation of women in positions of power (e.g. on company boards, in political decision-making, 
etc.).14 
The means of positive action are as numerous as the forms it can take. Quotas, action plans setting 
quantitative targets and timelines, mainstreaming of gender equality in policy- and decision-making, 
financial support in the form of subsidies, as well as training and non-financial support (e.g. flexible 
working hours, childcare facilities, etc.) are all different ways positive action can be implemented 
according to the European Commission.15
9 On this point see e.g. McColgan, Discrimination, equality and the lawequality and the law, pp. 81-88.
10 See e.g. De Vos, Beyond formal equality: Positive action under directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/ECMarc, p. 12 and Ellis, E. 
and Watson, P. (2013), EU anti-discrimination law, Oxford University Press, p. 505.
11 Conditional preference, in contrast to unconditional access, means that the mere membership in an under-represented 
group does not grant automatic access to the good in question but that other criteria such as qualifications are taken into 
account. These concepts are further discussed in section II(1) and II(2). 
12 McCrudden, ‘Rethinking positive action’, pp. 223-225.
13 See Craig and De Búrca, EU law: text, cases, and materials, pp. 950-951.
14 Ibid.
15 See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
interpretation of the judgment of the Court of Justice on 17 October 1995 in Case C-450/93, Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt 
Bremen (1996) COM(96)88 final, 9-10.
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II Positive action and EU law: a tense relationship
The legal sources of positive action in EU primary and secondary law
Historically, the formal recognition of positive action in EU law started with the former Equal Treatment 
Directive 76/207/EEC.16 In its Article 2(4), the directive provided the possibility for Member States to 
‘take measures to promote equal opportunity for men and women, in particular by removing existing 
inequalities which affect women’s opportunities’ in the field of employment. Despite the absence of an 
explicit mention of the notion of ‘positive action’ and the presence of the term ‘equal opportunity’, the 
case law of the Court of Justice progressively carved out today’s concept. In 1984, the Commission 
encouraged Member States ‘to adopt a positive action policy’ and delineated two main aims: to eliminate 
‘attitudes, behaviour and structures’ based on traditional gender roles and to enhance the participation 
of women in the labour market and their representation in positions of responsibility.17
In 1999, positive action made its way to primary law through an explicit mention in ex-Article 141(4) 
of the Amsterdam treaty (Article 157(4) TFEU) on equal pay. The terms of the debate changed slightly, 
with a new provision spelling out that, ‘with a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men 
and women in working life’, Member States could ‘maintai[n] or adop[t] measures providing for specific 
advantages in order to make it easier for the underrepresented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to 
prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers’.18
Interestingly, the mention of equal opportunities disappeared from this new wording and was replaced 
by the term ‘full equality in practice’, while the positive and remedial nature of the measures involved 
was clearly spelled out. This second legal definition shi!ed the concept away from the ambit of formal 
equality and closer to the domain of substantive equality. Women are however not specifically mentioned 
as the recipients of positive action measures but instead the more neutral term ‘underrepresented sex’ 
was used. This is also reflected in the wording of Article 23 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights on 
equality between women and men.19 While apparently making space for a contextual application of the 
legal provision, this change was criticised.20 
Article 2(4) of the former Equal Treatment Directive has now been replaced by a dedicated provision 
in the Gender Recast Directive. In line with the wording of Article 157(4) TFEU, Article 3 lays down 
a possibility, but no obligation, for Member States to adopt positive action measures in the area of 
employment. Its interpretation by the Court does not diverge from its earlier interpretation of the Treaty 
provision. Article 5 of Directive 2010/41/EU foresees the same possibility in the field of self-employment, 
while Article 6 of Directive 2004/113/EC allows for positive action in the consumption and supply of 
goods and services. Finally, concerning discrimination on the grounds of race, sexual orientation, age, 
disability and religion, positive action measures are also allowed by Articles 5 and 7 of the Race Equality 
Directive and the Framework Directive respectively.21 
16 Council of the European Union, Council Directive 76/207/ EC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of 
equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working 
conditions (1976) OJ L 39/40 (hereinafter former Equal Treatment Directive).
17 Council recommendation 84/635/EEC.
18 Article 157(4) TFEU.
19 Article 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights provides that: ‘Equality between women and men must be ensured in all 
areas, including employment, work and pay. The principle of equality shall not prevent the maintenance or adoption of 
measures providing for specific advantages in favour of the under-represented sex’.
20 However, the ‘Declaration (28) on Article 119(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community’ clarifies that ‘[w]hen 
adopting measures referred to in Article 119(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community [on positive action], 
Member States should, in the first instance, aim at improving the situation of women in working life’. See section III(3) for a 
critical discussion.
21 Council of the European Union, Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (2000) OJ L 180/22 and Council of the European Union, 
Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment 
and occupation (2000) OJ L 303/16.
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Despite an explicit recognition, EU law specifies neither what form these measures can take nor their 
content. Positive action remains an option for the Member States to decide on and to design. While the 
inscription of equality as a founding value and an overarching objective of the Union in Articles 2 and 
3(3) TEU could justify an obligation for Member States to adopt positive action measures, the principle 
of subsidiarity is likely to have tilted the balance in favour of more leeway for Member States to choose 
their equality model. As a consequence, it has been the task of the CJEU to flesh out the boundaries 
between lawful and unlawful positive action.
The CJEU walking the ‘tightrope’:22 a progressive delimitation of the boundaries 
of positive action between anti-discrimination and anti-stereotyping
As early as 1986 in Bilka-Kaufhaus, the CJEU decided that the Treaty article on equal pay (current Article 
157 TFEU) did not entail an obligation for employers to take into account and compensate a priori the 
disproportionate disadvantageous effects on women that an occupational pension scheme might have 
when designing its rules of operation.23 This ruling clarified that positive action is not an obligation under 
EU law but rather merely an option for Member States. Two years later, the Court found in Article 2(4) 
of the former Equal Treatment Directive 76/207/EC a legal basis for positive action, as it ‘allow[ed] 
measures which, although discriminatory in appearance, are in fact intended to eliminate or reduce 
actual instances of inequality which may exist in the reality of social life’.24
During the following decade, the CJEU refined the criteria for positive action measures to be compatible 
with EU law. Following infringement proceedings against France, the Court deemed, for instance, that 
special rights granted systematically to women by collective agreements25 were too general to constitute 
positive action.26 The Advocate General feared that the measures at stake would be discriminatory 
against non-beneficiaries (men) and risked perpetuating traditional gender roles, locking women into 
caretaking and men into breadwinning roles.27 The French example is particularly interesting in this 
regard and will therefore be extensively analysed in the fourth section of this article. The take-away 
message was that positive action measures should be narrowly tailored and clearly and objectively 
aimed at redressing specific disadvantages. These criteriahave been confirmed in later cases (Badeck, 
Abrahamsson, Griesmar).28 
The discussion of the scope of positive action focused on the issue of quotas with the landmark cases 
Kalanke and Marschall.29 In Kalanke, a preference was given by a German regional law to female job 
candidates if their qualifications were equal to those of male candidates. The Court ruled that unconditional 
or absolute quotas were discriminatory and thus not permissible under EU law. The Commission criticised 
the Court’s ruling and issued a communication reaffirming the need for positive action to challenge 
22 Senden, L. A. J. and Visser, M. (2013), ‘Balancing a tightrope: The EU Directive on improving the gender balance among 
non-executive directors of boards of listed companies’ European Gender Equality Law Review.
23 C-170/84 Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz [1986] EU:C:1986:204. See also De Vos, Beyond formal equality: 
Positive action under directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC, p. 14.
24 C-312/86 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [1988] EU:C:1988:485, 15 (hereinafter C-312/86 
Commission v France; to be distinguished from a second infringement proceeding decided the same year C-318/86 
Commission v France cited below).
25 C-312/86 Commission v France (1988), 8. These special rights are: longer maternity leave, shorter working hours, lower 
retirement age, days off when children are ill, subsidies in relation to childcare, etc.
26 C-312/86 Commission v France (1988), 8. See section (IV) for a detailed analysis.
27 According to A. G. Slynn, ‘France’s insistence on the traditional role of the mother […] ignores developments in society’. 
C-312/86 Commission v France (1988), Opinion of A. G. Slynn, EU:C:1988:428. See also Rapport d’audience présenté 
dans l’affaire 312/86, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:be18ec45-d47e-4557-9e33-
cfb510c6a337.0001.06/DOC_2&format=PDF accessed on 19 September 2018.
28 C-366/99 Joseph Griesmar v Ministre de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie and Ministre de la Fonction publique, de la 
Réforme de l’Etat et de la Décentralisation [2001] EU:C:2001:648, 87.
29 C‐450/93 Eckhard Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen [1995] EU:C:1995:322 and C‐409/95 Hellmut Marschall v Land 
Nordrhein‐Westfalen [1997] EU:C:1997:533.
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deeply entrenched inequalities.30 The Commission also provided an interpretation of Kalanke, considering 
that the Court had only outlawed automatic quotas.31 This was confirmed by the CJEU itself in Marschall. 
A quota scheme granting priority to equally qualified female candidates applying for a position where 
women are under-represented is allowed under EU law as long as the priority granted is not absolute but 
linked to an objective assessment of the individual situation of candidates. This assessment should allow 
‘reasons specific to an individual male candidate [to] tilt the balance in his favour’ and the criteria able 
to override the priority scheme should not be discriminatory against women.32 Following the boundaries 
drawn in these cases, the quotas for training and recruitment in Badeck were deemed flexible enough to 
be compatible with EU law.
In Abrahamsson and Briheche, the CJEU recognised as a ‘clear aim’ the achievement of ‘substantive, 
rather than formal, equality by reducing de facto inequalities which may arise in society’.33 However, 
lessons from these cases suggest that positive action measures should be proportionately tailored to 
reduce de facto inequalities, that is based on legitimate, clear, objective and reviewable criteria and 
strictly necessary to achieve their target in terms of content and duration. In Abrahamsson, the Court 
warned that granting priority to female candidates who had sufficient but not equal qualifications was 
going too far and was thus contrary to EU law. In the same way, in Briheche, a French rule that waived 
an age limit to sit a concours for entry to public-sector employment for widows who had not remarried 
was considered by the Court to be discriminatory against widowers who had not remarried. By contrast, 
following an argument made earlier in Griesmar (which we discuss in detail in section IV.2. below), in 
Lommers the rule governing the priority granted to female officials in access to childcare facilities was 
deemed proportionate if it allowed ‘male officials […] who take care of their children by themselves to 
have access to [the] nursery places scheme on the same conditions as female officials’.34
The jurisprudential construction of positive action in the field of gender equality in the EU illustrates 
two major difficulties. The first difficulty is linked to the fine line between granting advantages to a 
target group and avoiding these advantages proving discriminatory against other groups. Despite the 
boundaries drawn by the Court through the proportionality test and the scrutiny criteria developed in 
the past 30 years, this line is still not always evident when operationalising the notion of positive action 
through law- and policy-making at national level. This difficulty is illustrated by the recent case of Leone 
and Leone, decided in 2014, which concerns the granting by France of early retirement with service 
credit and immediate payment of pensions to civil servants who became parents and took career breaks 
of two months minimum to care for each of their children.35 Albeit neutral when taken at face value, 
this measure disadvantages male workers because ‘many more women than men [are able to] benefit’ 
from it and therefore indirect, as opposed to direct, sex discrimination was at stake, which could not be 
justified by what France presented as positive action.36
The second difficulty relates to finding the right balance between efforts to redress structural disadvantage 
by granting women substantive advantages and the risk of reinforcing existing gender stereotypes and 
30 COM(96)88 final.
31 Ibid.
32 Marschall (1997), 24. The CJEU labelled this a ‘saving clause’.
33 C-407/98 Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v Elisabet Fogelqvist [2000] EU:C:2000:367, 48 and C-319/03 Serge 
Briheche v Ministre de l’Intérieur, Ministre de l’Éducation nationale and Ministre de la Justice [2004] EU:C:2004:574, 25.
34 Griesmar (2001), 56 and C-476/99 H. Lommers v Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij [2002] EU:C:2002:183, 50 
and 30 (referring to Griesmar).
35 These career breaks can take the form of maternity leave, paternity leave, adoption leave, parental leave, parental care 
leave or leave. See C-173/13 Maurice Leone and Blandine Leone v Garde des Sceaux, ministre de la Justice and Caisse nationale 
de retraite des agents des collectivités locales [2014] EU:C:2014:2090, 82.
36 Ibid, 45. The case is particularly interesting as the objective justification test was quite strict. The CJEU rejected France’s 
argument that the measure constituted positive action under Article 141(4) TEC (Article 157(4) TFEU). The Court 
argued that such a scheme could not ‘remedy for the problems which [women] may encounter in the course of their 
professional career, and does not […] offset the disadvantages to which the[ir] careers are exposed by helping them in 
their professional life and thereby ensure full equality in practice between men and women in working life’. See also ibid, 
101, following the argument previously made in Griesmar (2001), 50, 64 and subsequently in C-46/06 Commission of the 
European Communities v Italian Republic [2008] EU:C:2008:618, 57.
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perpetuating the segregation of women in caregiving roles outside the labour market.37 Roca Alvarez is 
a good illustration of this tension between advantaging and stereotyping women.38 This case concerned 
a Spanish legal provision which granted female workers who had become mothers breastfeeding leave, 
while it granted breastfeeding leave to male workers who had become fathers only when their partner 
was employed (thereby excluding the male partners of self-employed women and women who were 
not employed). The CJEU found that this rule was discriminatory and thus could not ‘be considered […] 
a measure eliminating or reducing existing inequalities in society within the meaning of Article 2(4) 
of Directive 76/207, nor a measure seeking to achieve substantive as opposed to formal equality by 
reducing the real inequalities that can arise in society and thus, in accordance with Article 157(4) TFEU, 
to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in the professional careers of the relevant persons’.39 By 
contrast, it was ‘liable to perpetuate a traditional distribution of the roles of men and women by keeping 
men in a role subsidiary to that of women in relation to the exercise of their parental duties’.40 
Recent case law development confirmed the Court’s caution towards measures presented as positive 
action but risking perpetuating gender segregation and stereotypes. In Maïstrellis in 2015, the Court 
considered a measure preventing a male judge from taking paid parental leave if his wife is not employed 
unless, due to a serious illness or injury, she is unable to take care of the child.41 The CJEU clarified that 
such a measure, ‘far from ensuring full equality in practice between men and women in working life’, 
reinforced traditional gender roles, overburdening women with caretaking duties.42
III  A comparative outlook: how and where is positive action 
implemented at national level?43
All 28 EU Member States have enacted legislation on positive action.44 The ways in which positive action 
has been integrated into national law however range across a broad spectrum, from binding legal 
obligations in a minority of EU Member States to simple voluntary measures in a majority of them. 
National provisions on positive action also vary with regard to their scope of application, ranging, in 
the majority, from limited public sector requirements to, more rarely, wide-reaching public and private 
obligations.
Compulsory vs optional positive action
Greece, Germany and Finland are examples of the few jurisdictions in which ‘hard’ positive action measures 
have been adopted. In Greece, positive action is ‘well understood and widely applied by the courts in their 
jurisprudence’.45 Article 116(2) of the Constitution provides for a general obligation for the State and 
37 An interesting contribution on this topic compares the US to the EU approach to maternity leave and retirement. See Suk, 
J. C. (2012) ‘From antidiscrimination to equality: Stereotypes and the life cycle in the United States and Europe’, American 
Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 60, p. 75.
38 C-104/09 Pedro Manuel Roca Álvarez v Sesa Start España ETT SA [2010] EU:C:2010:561.
39 Ibid, 38.
40 Ibid, 36 and Lommers (2002), 41.
41 C-222/14 Konstantinos Maïstrellis v Ypourgos Dikaiosynis, Diafaneias kai Anthropinon Dikaiomaton [2015] EU:C:2015:473, 22.
42 Maïstrellis (2015), 50.
43 This section is largely based on information provided by the national experts of the European network of legal experts in 
gender equality law. For more information, please refer to: https://www.equalitylaw.eu/. The authors of this article would 
also like to thank Nada Bodiroga-Vukobrat, Jean Jacqmain, Sophia Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulos, Adrijana Martinovic, Kevät 
Nousiainen, Panagiota Petroglou, Marlies Vegter and Nathalie Wuiame for the ad hoc expertise they provided on the issue 
of positive action in their respective national contexts.
44 Timmer, A. and Senden, L. (2017), How are EU rules transposed into national law in 2017? A comparative analysis of gender 
equality law in Europe, European Commission, BrusselsBrussels, 2017, p. 13.
45 We thank Sophia Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulos and Panagiota Petroglou for providing us with this information. See Koukoulis-
Spiliotopoulos, S. (2003) ‘Greece: From Formal to Substantive Gender Equality. The leading role of the jurisprudence and 
the contribution of women’s NGOs’ in Manganas, A. (2003) Essays in Honour of Alice Yotopoulos-Marangopoulos, Panteion 
University/Bruylant.
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the public sector to adopt positive action measures to promote gender equality.46 The material scope of 
this provision is much wider than EU law, as it applies to all relevant areas in which public authorities 
are involved.47 In Germany, Article 3(2)(2) of the Federal Constitution establishes an obligation for public 
entities to further women’s equality in practice.48 This takes the form of plans seeking to increase female 
representation in employment, including hiring and promotion practices. However, since the effectiveness 
of these practices has been questioned, some Länder have recently adopted gender quotas following the 
criteria set by the CJEU.49
In Finland, the requirement for positive action goes even further as it applies not only to the public 
but also to the private sector, and notably to employers and educational institutions. Finnish public 
authorities have a positive duty to promote gender equality in preparatory work and decision-making 
and Finnish law provides for a quota of 40 % for the representation of women in non-elected decision-
making bodies.50 Sanctions are foreseen if the quota is not respected, notably the annulment of the 
appointment decision.51 The same quota and rules apply to the administrative and executive boards 
of companies where the majority shareholder is a public entity.52 Positive action is also required of 
private employers and educational institutions through equality plans.53 Examples of measures are the 
monitoring and correction of the gender pay gap for private employers and the prevention of sexual 
harassment for educational institutions.54 These positive action requirements are subject to enforcement 
by the Equality Ombudsman and the Non-Discrimination and Equality Tribunal.55
At the other end of the spectrum, in many EU Member States positive action is not considered a priority 
and therefore remains rather limited.56 For example, positive action is generally neither required nor 
permitted by Latvian law save a few exceptions. Examples include ad hoc vocational training programmes 
and supportive measures for unemployed members of disadvantaged groups (e.g. parents returning 
from care leave, people living with disabilities, young people and older people, etc.)57 and an obligation 
to ‘tak[e] into account the principle of equal representation of gender’ in the election of the chairpersons 
of the departments of the Latvian Supreme Court and of the Chief Justices of its Chambers.58 These 
measures, however, do not take the form of binding provisions but, rather, are of a voluntary nature or 
merely represent principles to be observed without quantitative targets. No sanctions are foreseen by 
the law if they are not respected.59 Apart from the Latvian example, positive action requirements mainly 
46 Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulos, S. and Petroglou, P. (2018), Country report gender equality: Greece. How are EU rules transposed 
into national law?, European network of legal experts in gender equality and non-discrimination; European Union.
47 Ibid, quoting Article 19 of Act 3896/2010 transposing Directive 2006/54 and Article 5 of Act 3769/2009 transposing 
Directive 2004/113.
48 Lembke, U. (2018), Country report gender equality: Germany. How are EU rules transposed into national law?, European 
network of legal experts in gender equality and non-discrimination; European Union, p. 14.
49 Ibid, p. 14: e.g. North Rhine-Westphalia, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania and Lower Saxony, requiring that women are 
substantially equally qualified.
50 See Nousiainen, K. (2018) Country report gender equality: Finland. How are EU rules transposed into national law?, European 
network of legal experts in gender equality and non-discrimination; European Union, p. 13: the quota applies to 
‘government committees, advisory boards, working groups and other equivalent preparation, planning and decision-
making bodies’ as well as to ‘municipal and inter-municipal co-operation bodies’. Special reasons can justify a derogation 
and municipal councils are excluded from the quota system. See Section 4 of the Act on Equality, available at https://
julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/75131/Act_on%20Equality_between_women_and_men_2015_FINAL.
pdf?sequence=1.
51 Nousiainen, Country report gender equality: Finland. How are EU rules transposed into national law?, p. 13.
52 Ibid, pp. 13-14.
53 This concerns employers with 30 or more employees. Ibid, p. 14.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid, p. 15.
56 Timmer and Senden, How are EU rules transposed into national law in 2017? A comparative analysis of gender equality law in 
Europe, p. 13.
57 Ibid. Article 3(1) (4) of the Unemployed and Job-seekers Support Law mentions ‘occupational training, retraining and 
raising of qualifications’ as possible measures but does not give more details on the kind of positive action measures to be 
adopted.
58 Ibid, p. 13, quoting the Law on Judicial Power (Likums ‘Par tiesu varu’), Official Gazette No. 1, 14 January 1993, respective 
amendments Official Gazette No. 160, 7 October 2005. Article 44(2) of the Law on Judicial Power and Part V (65).
59 Ibid.
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take the form of so! law rather than hard law measures in a majority of countries in the EU. When they 
exist, binding obligations tend to concern the public sector. In general, they represent an exception in the 
private sector, where positive action measures may nonetheless exist on a voluntary basis. The following 
paragraphs provide a brief comparative overview of the issues and fields in which positive action has 
been implemented at the national level.
Fields of application: where and how can positive action contribute to gender 
equality?
This section first explores examples of positive action measures as expressly allowed under the Gender 
Recast Directive 2006/54/EC and Directive 2004/113/EC on goods and services. It then turns to the 
representation of women in positions of economic and political power, which has recently been addressed 
by various EU legal and policy instruments.60
Access to employment, promotion and pay
Several mechanisms aim to improve access for women in employment. The most well-known, but also the 
most controversial, are the so-called gender quotas, which attribute priority to women in relation to hiring, 
promotion and other employment-related matters. The categorisation proposed by Linda Senden and 
Goran Selanec usefully highlights the great variety of forms that quotas can take. ‘Absolute’ preferences 
grant automatic priority solely based on membership of a target group; ‘strong’ preferences grant priority 
to members of a target group who fulfil some minimum requirements; ‘tie-break’ preferences grant 
priority to members of a target group if they are equally qualified for a position or benefit; ‘flexible’ 
preferences are similar to tie-break preferences but accept that other overriding social goals modify the 
distribution of priority; and ‘weak’ preferences consider membership of a target group as one of several 
criteria for granting priority.61 Only the last two forms seem to have been accepted by the CJEU so far.62
Several Member States have put in place employment quotas. In Germany, following the early cases of 
Kalanke and Marschall, discussions have focused more recently on the issue of objective and individual 
comparative assessments as required by the CJEU to grant preferences to female job candidates.63 
As ‘there are nearly never two persons with equal qualifications, let alone a man and a woman’, this 
quota system had been described by experts as ‘ineffective’ and difficult to apply.64 North Rhine-
Westphalia therefore planned to change the requirement of ‘equal qualifications’ to ‘substantially equal 
qualifications’ in order to smoothe the difficulties linked to such comparative assessments in relation to 
the gender quota system in place at regional level for recruitment in the civil service.65 However, the State 
60 Directive 2014/95/EU on disclosure of non-financial and diversity information established reporting obligations 
for large listed companies in relation to inter alia gender equality. Recommendations have been made on these 
reporting obligations: Communication from the Commission (2017/C215/01), Guidelines on non-financial reporting 
(methodology for reporting non-financial information), available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX:52017XC0705(01) accessed on 28 September 2018. Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities for 
Women and Men (2017) Opinion on “Gender balance in decisionmaking in politics”, available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/
sites/info/files/final_version_5_december.pdf accessed on 28 September 2018.
61 See Selanec and Senden, Positive action measures to ensure full equality in practice between men and women, including on 
company boards, pp. 4-5.
62 See section II(2) of this article.
63 Kalanke (1995) and Marschall (1997).
64 Lembke, Country report gender equality: Germany. How are EU rules transposed into national law?, p. 15.
65 Ibid, p. 14: ‘female civil servants were to be given preference in promotion under provision of substantially equal 
qualification, aptitude and professional performance based upon an equivalent overall evaluation in the applicant’s latest 
assessment report, unless specific hardships occurred in the person of a male applicant, and under the further conditions 
of a lower proportion of female civil servants in the higher position applied for than in the corresponding lower positions 
and not having reached 50 % yet’ and quoting the 2016 Statute on the Modernisation of the Civil Service Law.
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Administrative Court of North Rhine-Westphalia rejected that amendment and the new quota system 
was repealed in 2017.66
In the Netherlands, some employers, such as the University of Del!, who were willing to increase the 
number of female professors, reserved a number of tenure-track positions for female academics.67 This 
measure was deemed lawful by the Dutch equality body because it aimed to combat the persevering 
structural disadvantages suffered by women in the face of the inefficiency of numerous earlier measures 
taken by the University Board. Despite the Dutch equality body’s approval, doubts were raised as regards 
the measure’s permissibility under Article 157(4) TFEU and the CJEU case law following Kalanke.68 Other 
similar measures taken around the same time, for instance an initiative by the University of Groningen to 
invite only female applicants for a professorship position, were considered discriminatory against men.69 
Other examples include Austria, where 40 % female representation needs to be reached at all levels 
of the federal and provincial civil service.70 The European Commission itself adopted positive action 
measures and indicated that it was ‘well on track to meet its own target of 40 % female representation 
in senior and middle management positions by 2019’, with a rate of about 35 % in 2017.71 
Beyond quotas and quantitative targets, numerous other types of measures have been adopted that 
address the representation of women on the labour market as well as their working conditions, including 
pay. In Denmark, initiatives such as specific training offered to female staff are allowed for a limited 
period of time under the condition that the representation of one gender is 25 % or less of the whole 
workforce.72 Following the Commission’s recent efforts to tackle the gender pay gap,73 the issue of pay 
transparency has been on the political agenda of a number of EU Member States. In Poland, positive 
action measures in the field of pay have translated into the creation of a free IT application which lets 
users calculate the pay gap in their professional sector.74
Positive action in the consumption and supply of goods and services
There are fewer instances of positive action in the field of the consumption and supply of goods and 
services. An interesting example was provided in 2017 by a textile company that launched a marketing 
campaign to raise awareness about the gender pay gap in Finland.75 It reflected the average difference 
between women’s and men’s pay by selling its products at 83 % of their usual price to its female 
customers and announced that the benefits of the campaign would be donated to an organisation 
protecting women’s rights.76 The campaign was not exclusionary in the sense that all customers would 
have been entitled to the discount upon request, without being required to demonstrate their gender 
identity. However, the campaign triggered several complaints of discrimination. The Equality Ombudsman 
66 See ibid, p. 15 quoting: Statute on Amendments to the Civil Service Law of North Rhine-Westphalia of 19 September 
2017, available at https://www.landtag.nrw.de/portal/WWW/dokumentenarchiv/Dokument?Id=XMMGVB1729|764|765 
and State Administrative Court of North Rhine-Westphalia, judgment of 21 February 2017, 6 B 1109/16. This decision pre-
empted a decision of the State Constitutional Court on the topic.
67 Vegter, M. (2018), Country report gender equality: The Netherlands. How are EU rules transposed into national law?, European 
network of legal experts in gender equality and non-discrimination; European Union2018, p. 11.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Thomasberger, M. (2018), Country report gender equality: Austria. How are EU rules transposed into national law?, European 
network of legal experts in gender equality and non-discrimination; European Union, p. 12: Paragraph 8 of the Equal 
Treatment Act (Private Sector) and Paragraphs 11 to 11d of the Federal Equal Treatment Act for Civil Servants.
71 European Commission, International Women’s Day 2017: Gender equality – a European export (8 March 2017) available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-489_en.htm accessed on 20 September 2018.
72 Jørgensen, S. (2018), Country report gender equality: Denmark. How are EU rules transposed into national law?, European 
network of legal experts in gender equality and non-discrimination; European Union2018, p. 12.
73 European Commission, EU Action Plan 2017-2019 Tackling the gender pay gap COM(2017)678 (2017).
74 See Zielińska, E. (2018), Country report gender equality: Poland. How are EU rules transposed into national law?, European 
network of legal experts in gender equality and non-discrimination; European Union2018, pp. 13-14.
75 See Nousiainen, Country report gender equality: Finland. How are EU rules transposed into national law?
76 Ibid.
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in fine concluded that it was not discriminatory as long as all customers had clearly been informed 
that they were de facto entitled to the discount.77 This is an interesting example which could pose new 
questions in relation to EU law in the future. The initiative of the Finnish company can surely be regarded 
as a case of overstretching the concept of positive action. At the same time, it can also be considered 
to be a thought-provoking, symbolic initiative. While this measure can de facto do little to improve full 
equality in practice, it does increase the visibility of, and public awareness about, the problem of the 
gender pay gap.
On 8 March 2018, the Lithuanian equality body launched a campaign against gender-based pricing 
called ‘Price Has No Gender’.78 The Lithuanian Ombudsperson deemed the decision of a car-washing 
company to offer discounts to female customers only in order to demonstrate the user-friendliness of a 
new service discriminatory.79 This example demonstrates how ‘positive action’ risks being misinterpreted, 
misappropriated and misused as a pretext to implement measures that actually reinforce existing harmful 
gender stereotypes. Typically, the initiative described above is based on a traditional representation of 
segregated gender roles, with activities related to cars viewed as ‘masculine’, which affects collective 
representations of women’s capabilities and can have demeaning effects on gender equality (e.g. the 
argument that a traditionally masculine service has become ‘easy-to-use’ so women can now use it).80
Positive action measures aimed at improving the gender balance on company boards
The equal representation of women on company boards has been an important topic on the EU agenda 
for many years now.81 In 2012, the Commission proposed a directive which aimed to improve the gender 
balance on non-executive company boards.82 The initial plan was to set a quantitative objective of 40 % 
for the proportion of each gender on company boards to be reached by 2020 for the private sector and 
by 2018 for the public sector. However, while a broad consensus exists on the necessity of improving 
the representation of women in this area and many Member States have adopted measures to this end, 
the directive proposal has now been blocked in the Council for years. Member States mainly disagree 
about the transformation of positive action into a binding EU obligation and remain in favour of more 
subsidiarity.83 
At the national level, some Member States, such as Belgium, France, Italy, Germany and more recently 
Portugal and Austria, have adopted hard legal measures such as mandatory quotas along with sanctions 
in case of non-respect, in order to improve the gender balance at the level of company management.84 
77 Ibid, quoting the Equality Ombudsman’s opinion of 29.08.2017, Dnro TAS/225/2017.
78 See Davulis, T. (2018) The Office of the Equal Opportunities’ Ombudsperson in Lithuania started campaign against possible 
discriminatory pricing of services for women and men, European Network of legal experts in gender equality and non-
discrimination; European Union, 24 July 2018, available at https://www.equalitylaw.eu/downloads/4651-lithuania-the-
office-of-of-the-equal-opportunities-ombudsperson-in-lithuania-started-campaign-against-possible-discriminatory-
pricing-of-services-for-women-and-men-pdf-138-kb accessed on 28 September 2018.
79 Ibid.
80 The subsequent pilot study launched by the Ombudsperson also revealed discriminatory ‘gender pricing’ based on gender 
stereotypes in beauty services such as hairdressing, manicuring, etc. While hairdressing is tendentially more expensive for 
women, a manicure or a pedicure is more expensive for men. See ibid.
81 See e.g. Selanec and Senden, Positive action measures to ensure full equality in practice between men and women, including 
on company boards and Oliveira, Á. and Gondek, M. (2014), ‘Women on Company Boards – An Example of Positive Action 
in Europe’ EUI Working Papers 2014/34, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.
82 European Commission, Proposal of 14 November 2012 for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on improving the gender balance among nonexecutive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related 
measures (2012) COM (2012) 614 final.
83 Council of the European Union, Progress Report of 31 May 2017 on the Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on improving the gender balance among directors of companies listed on stock 
exchanges and related measures (2017) 2012/0299 (COD), 2, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CONSIL:ST_9496_2017_INIT&from=EN accessed on 19 September 2018.
84 Senden, L. and Kruisinga, S. (2018), Gender-balanced company boards in Europe: A comparative analysis of the regulatory, 
policy and enforcement approaches in the EU and EEA Member States, European Network of legal experts in gender equality 
and non-discrimination; European Union, available at https://www.equalitylaw.eu/downloads/4537-gender-balanced-
company-boards-in-europe-pdf-1-68-mb accessed on 20 September 2018, p. 52. See also van Hoof, F. (2018), ‘Key 
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These measures generally apply to all state-owned companies and to private companies of a certain 
size, o!en those listed on the stock exchange. In Austria for example, legislative developments that 
entered into force in January 2018 now require companies listed on the stock exchange with 1 000 
employees or more to apply a 30 % quota to improve the gender balance on any supervisory board that 
has six or more members. Breaching this rule is sanctioned by an empty seat policy.85 
In Estonia, Finland, Greece and Slovenia, binding legislation has been adopted with a view to this but 
exclusively in relation to state-owned companies.86 Other Member States have adopted a so! regulatory 
approach applying either to the private sector or both public and private companies, such as Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Romania and Spain.87 For instance, the Netherlands has adopted 
a comply-or-explain mechanism according to which companies must meet a 30 % target for the 
representation of each gender on company boards. Renewed in 2017, this so! legal mechanism foresees 
that if the target is not reached, companies have to explain the reasons for failure and the measures put 
in place in order to remedy the gender imbalance.88 However, research shows that the efficiency of such 
a mechanism is minimal in the Dutch context.89 Spanish law foresees a similar mechanism but without 
setting any quantitative target.90
In contrast, in 2017 Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and 
Slovakia had no legal provisions aiming to increase the representation of women on company boards.91 
However, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Malta and Slovakia do have policy measures in place in this regard.92 
Examples of recent policy measures in Malta include a monitoring programme aimed at advancing the 
careers of women in economic decision-making, along with a directory of professional women ‘giving 
visibility and more opportunities to professional and competent women for appointment on boards and 
committees’.93 A diversity charter was adopted in May 2017 in Slovakia, which aims to support diversity 
and inclusion in the workplace through several channels such as awareness-raising initiatives, training, 
mainstreaming diversity in human resources, decision-making, etc.94 In Croatia, these policy measures 
developments at national level in legislation, case law and policy’, European Equality Law Review, Vol. 1, pp. 60 and 107 
available at https://www.equalitylaw.eu/downloads/4639-european-equality-law-review-1-2018-pdf-1-086-kb accessed 
on 28 September 2018; Thomasberger, M. (2017), Austria enacts legislation for a 30 % quota of women on supervisory 
company boards, European Network of legal experts in gender equality law; European Union, 23 November 2017, 
available at https://www.equalitylaw.eu/downloads/4510-austria-austria-enacts-legislation-for-a-30-quota-of-women-
on-supervisory-company-boards-pdf-168-kb accessed on 28 September 2018; Palma Ramalho, M. do R. (2017), Recent 
developments in Portuguese employment law regarding women on company boards, European Network of legal experts 
in gender equality law; European Union, 23 November 2017, available at https://www.equalitylaw.eu/downloads/4512-
portugal-recent-developments-in-portuguese-employment-law-regarding-women-on-company-boards-pdf-120-kb 
accessed on 28 September 2018.
85 Thomasberger, Country report gender equality: Austria. How are EU rules transposed into national law?, p. 13. This rule does 
not apply to companies whose workforce is composed of less than 20 % of employees of one sex.
86 Senden and Kruisinga, Gender-balanced company boards in Europe: A comparative analysis of the regulatory, policy and 
enforcement approaches in the EU and EEA Member Statespolicy and enforcement approaches in the EU and EEA Member 
States, p. 47.
87 Ibid.
88 Vegter, Country report gender equality: The Netherlands. How are EU rules transposed into national law?, p. 12.
89 Ibid, p. 12, quoting Letter to Parliament, 6 March 2018, ref. 1327715.
90 Ballester Pastor, M. A. (2018), Country report gender equality: Spain. How are EU rules transposed into national law?, European 
network of legal experts in gender equality and non-discrimination; European Union, p. 11.
91 Senden and Kruisinga, Gender-balanced company boards in Europe: A comparative analysis of the regulatory, policy and 
enforcement approaches in the EU and EEA Member Statespolicy and enforcement approaches in the EU and EEA Member 
States, p. 46.
92 Ibid, p. 59.
93 Both initiatives were launched in 2015 with the support of the European Union. See ibid, p. 58 and National Commission 
for the Promotion of Equality, ‘Gender balance in decision-making’ (2016), available at https://ncpe.gov.mt/en/Pages/
Projects_and_Specific_Initiatives/Gender_Balance_in_Decision_Making.aspx accessed on 28 September 2018.
94 Magurová, Z. (2018), Country report gender equality: Slovakia. How are EU rules transposed into national law?, European 
network of legal experts in gender equality and non-discrimination; European Union, p. 15, and Pontis, N. ‘Charta Diverzity’ 
(2017), available at https://www.chartadiverzity.sk/charta-diverzity-sr/english-summary/ accessed on 28 September 2018.
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took the form of a public campaign including the launch of a special website, awareness-raising through 
the media and educational seminars promoting gender equality on company boards.95
Political representation and elected functions
The representation of women in positions of political power is as important for gender equality as 
their presence in the economic sector. Some Member States such as Belgium, France and Slovenia 
have imposed diverse forms of quotas to improve gender equality in political elections. In Belgium, 
for instance, a quota system ensures the parity of electoral lists at all levels of the State (federal, 
regional and local) – a measure described as ‘highly effective’.96 In Slovenia, a gender quota of 40 % was 
introduced in the early 2000s for local elections and elections to the European Parliament, and in 2006 
a gender quota of 35 % was introduced for national parliamentary elections. Electoral lists proposed by 
political parties can be rejected in case of non-respect.97 In France, the law on departmental elections 
was reformed in 2013 to introduce a binominal system by which voters no longer choose one candidate 
but a team composed of a man and a woman.98
In Germany, the State Constitutional Court of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, later imitated by the 
State Labour Court of Schleswig-Holstein, confirmed the validity of a provision of the regional equal 
treatment legislation which, in the public sector, reserved the right to run and vote for the position of 
equal opportunities commissioner to female employees only.99 Arguing that women are the victims of 
structural discrimination, the Court explained that the law constituted a positive action measure meant to 
compensate for the disadvantages generally suffered by women in their working life, e.g. the difficulties 
of reconciling work and family life, sexual harassment in the workplace, their under-representation in 
leading positions, etc. Thus it departed from a formal equality approach, stating that special measures 
are essential to achieve substantive equality.100
By contrast, in Sweden, where the representation of women in both the Parliament and the Government 
amounts to almost 50 %, no gender quotas were used. This relative gender balance was achieved 
thanks to a voluntary practice among political parties which, motivated by public expectations, appoint 
a woman as every second candidate for political elections.101 Finally, other types of positive action 
measures include training, awareness-raising campaigns, capacity-building, mentoring and networking 
programmes to encourage women to enter politics. Such policies are in place, for instance, in Slovenia 
through the project ‘Meta Dekleta – Promotion of active citizenship of young women’ and Ireland with 
the platform ‘Women for election’.102
95 Nacsa, B. (2018), Country report gender equality: Hungary. How are EU rules transposed into national law?, European network 
of legal experts in gender equality and non-discrimination; European Union, pp. 13-14.
96 Article 11bis of the Constitution quoted in Jacqmain, J. (2018) Country report gender equality: Belgium. How are EU rules 
transposed into national law?, European network of legal experts in gender equality and non-discrimination; European 
Union, p. 14, and European Commission, 2018 report on equality between women and men in the EU, Publications Office of 
the European Union, p. 29.
97 European Commission, 2018 report on equality between women and men in the EU.
98 Ibid.
99 See Lembke, Country report gender equality: Germany. How are EU rules transposed into national law?, p. 15, citing State 
Constitutional Court of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, judgment of 10 October 2017, LVerfG 7/16 and State Labour Court 
of Schleswig-Holstein, judgment of 2 November 2017, 2 Sa 262 d/17. The measure applied to all bodies where such an 
equal opportunities commissioner had to be elected, i.e. in employee councils, councils of judges and public prosecutors’ 
councils in all regional public institutions (state schools, public administration, courts, etc.). The task of the equal 
opportunities commissioner is to promote gender equality in these bodies.
100 Ibid, p. 15.
101 Julén Votinius, J. (2018), Country report gender equality: Sweden. How are EU rules transposed into national law?, European 
network of legal experts in gender equality and non-discrimination; European Union, p. 13.
102 Commission, 2018 report on equality between women and men in the EU, p. 30. Meta Dekleta – Promotion of Active 
citizenship of young women, available at https://eeagrants.org/project-portal/project/SI03-0014 accessed on 28 
September 2018, and Women for Election, available at http://www.womenforelection.ie/ accessed on 28 September 2018.
49
Positive action in practice: some dos and don’ts in the field of EU gender equality law
Difficulties
Many difficulties exist with regard to the implementation of positive action at the national level. Firstly, 
it can prove arduous to draw general rules of application from the boundaries established by the CJEU 
between lawful and unlawful positive action, let alone to transpose these rules into concrete policy-
making. In fact, it has been deplored that the complexity and restrictiveness of the rules deployed by the 
CJEU in its successive case law in effect hinder positive action.103 In Germany, the difficulties exposed above 
in relation to the comparative assessment of equal qualifications for male and female job candidates 
were also signalled as a recurring obstacle to the effectiveness of positive action.104 In Sweden, experts 
highlight increasing uncertainties about the scope and meaning of positive action following the CJEU’s 
invalidating decision in the Abrahamsson case.105 Furthermore, the very definition of individual merit, 
which is used in EU law and beyond as a yardstick to articulate the limits of positive action,106 is highly 
indeterminate and therefore makes designing lawful positive action measures challenging.107 
Secondly, the indeterminacy and vagueness of the set of recommendations and measures o!en 
contained in action plans and strategic documents might also hinder the effective implementation of 
concrete positive action measures.
The question of the beneficiaries of positive action is also challenging. While some national legislation, 
such as the Dutch law for instance, explicitly refers to women, EU law remains neutral and speaks of 
the ‘under-represented sex’. The use of this neutral formulation was criticised, as men are o!en not a 
disadvantaged group even when they are under-represented.108
A further challenge is the enforcement of positive action. In fact, the merely declaratory nature of positive 
action measures, the lack of precise targets and objectives and the absence of dissuasive sanctions and 
appropriate remedies in case of breaches have repeatedly been signalled as obstacles to their proper 
implementation.109 In Finland, for instance, the enforcement of legislation is not monitored effectively 
and sanctions for non-implementation are o!en not consistently implemented.110 In Belgium, the Gender 
Act in principle allows positive action, which is considered a lawful justification for differential treatment, 
but is in fact still awaiting implementation through a Royal Decree that has not yet been adopted, 
leaving positive action in a grey zone.111 Enforcement should also address the differences in gender 
representation across the hierarchical spectrum within given sectors. In Croatia for instance, it would not 
be enough to consider the average representation of women among judges, as it ranges from 72 % in 
municipal courts to 23 % at the Constitutional Court.112
Finally, positive action can prove a double-edged sword, as its positive effects on gender equality risk 
being offset by the resentment, misunderstandings and controversies it o!en provokes. In a number of 
EU Member States, including Germany, Belgium, Croatia and the Netherlands, experts express concerns 
103 Vegter, Country report gender equality: The Netherlands. How are EU rules transposed into national law?, p. 11 and Timmer 
and Senden, How are EU rules transposed into national law in 2017? A comparative analysis of gender equality law in Europe.
104 Lembke, Country report gender equality: Germany. How are EU rules transposed into national law?, p. 14.
105 Julén Votinius, Country report gender equality: Sweden. How are EU rules transposed into national law?, p. 12.
106 See section II(2) of this article.
107 See McCrudden, ‘Rethinking positive action’, p. 225.
108 See, for instance, what Bourdieu calls the ‘double standard’: ‘As is seen in the difference between the chef and the cook, 
the couturier and the seamstress, a reputedly female task only has to be taken over by a man and performed outside the 
private sphere in order for it to be thereby ennobled and transfigured’. Bourdieu, P. (2001), Masculine domination, Stanford 
University Press, p. 60.
109 We would like to thank Nada Bodiroga-Vukobrat, Adrijana Martinovic, Kevät Nousiainen and Marlies Vegter for 
highlighting this.
110 See Nousiainen, Country report gender equality: Finland. How are EU rules transposed into national law?, p. 15.
111 Jacqmain, J., Country report gender equality: Belgium. How are EU rules transposed into national law?, p. 13.
112 We thank Nada Bodiroga-Vukobrat and Adrijana Martinovic for highlighting this data. See Edina Aranjoš Borovac (2018), 
Women and Men in Croatia, 2018, p. 58, p. 56 available at https://www.dzs.hr/Hrv_Eng/menandwomen/men_and_
women_2018.pdf accessed on 11 October 2018.
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over ‘fundamental misunderstandings’, ‘under-development’,‘clumsy usages’ and ‘resistance’ in relation 
to the purpose and content of positive action measures.113 Positive action is a popular ground for political 
hijacking by populist and conservative parties in some Member States, such as Germany, where it has also 
been increasingly contested in courts.114 Stigmatisation of what are pejoratively called ‘quota women’ 
or quota groups is also alarming, as beneficiaries of positive action risk being victimised and their skills 
and qualifications denigrated, therefore defeating the very purpose of positive action.115 At the level of 
political debates, for instance in the Netherlands, the misunderstandings surrounding positive action 
have led to resistance and frustration from majority groups who see themselves as disadvantaged, but 
also from minority groups themselves, who do not want to be categorized as the beneficiaries of quotas 
or preferences.116
While this section has given concrete examples of the enforcement of positive action at the level of EU 
Member States and has analysed some of its legal, social and political consequences, the next section 
delves in detail into the legal articulation of the concept and the difficulties of its deployment. To this end, 
the analysis focuses on the French example – France having played a historical role in the development 
of the concept of positive action through its judicial dialogue with the CJEU.
IV  The limitations and difficulties of positive action: the example 
of the French context
The difficulties and limitations of positive action are well illustrated by the arduous process of its 
integration into the French legal system.
French constitutional tradition
It is well known that French law is defined by its generality and is fundamentally imbued with the principle 
of equality, which is different from the principle of non-discrimination.117 Article 1 of the Declaration of 
Human and Civic Rights of 1789, which still forms part of positive law in France, states that ‘[m]en are 
born and remain free and equal in rights’ and that the law ‘must be the same for all, whether it protects 
or punishes’. It further provides that ‘[a]ll citizens, being equal in the eyes of the law, are equally eligible to 
all dignities and to all public positions and occupations, according to their abilities, and without distinction 
except that of their virtues and talents.’118 Article 1 of the Constitution, which remained unchanged until 
2008, maintains this principle: ‘France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It 
113 A notable exception to this is the case of Greece, where experts Sophia Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulos and Panagiota Petroglou 
find positive action to be generally well understood and widely applied. A further exception in relation to Finland is worth 
mentioning. Kevät Nousiainen finds that positive action is positively regarded by social partners as a less confrontational 
method to combat discrimination. Regarding Belgium, Jean Jacqmain and Nathalie Wuiame point out an interesting 
example in the civil service of the Brussels Capital Region, where an assessment for promotion found a male and a female 
candidate of equal merit and the female candidate was promoted, the Government arguing positive action in favour of 
women. The male applicant challenged this decision and the Conseil d’Etat (highest administrative court) annulled the 
decision, arguing that it lacked the formal motivation required by the Act of 29 July 1991, as the Government did not 
demonstrate that women were under-represented in that particular professional category (Khassime, 6 October 2015, 
n°232.451). See Lembke, Country report gender equality: Germany. How are EU rules transposed into national law?, p. 15. We 
would also like to thank the national experts of the countries mentioned for providing their views on the development of 
positive action in their national context.
114 Ibid, p. 15.
115 Ibid. We would like to thank Kevät Nousiainen for drawing our attention to the term ‘quota women’ in relation to the 
Finnish debate on positive action.
116 We would like to thank the Dutch expert, Marlies Vegter, for drawing our attention to these counter-reactions.
117 Equality means that persons in the same or a similar situation must be treated equally. A comparison is required to 
establish differential treatment, and the cause of this unequal treatment does not matter. By contrast, non-discrimination 
means that no decision impacting a person can be taken if motivated by a prohibited criterion. A comparison may be 
useful to establish discrimination but is not always necessary, and the prohibited criterion must be shown.
118 Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme [Declaration of Human and Civic Rights] (1789), Articles 1 and 6.
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shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion’.119 
The preamble to the Constitution of 1946, which also forms part of positive law, specifies that, ‘[t]he law 
guarantees women equal rights to those of men in all spheres’.
However, not all men, and a fortiori not all women, were included in this conception of equality. Women 
and colonised peoples, who had special status, did not have equal rights. It was not until 1936 that the 
Conseil d’État (Council of State) granted women access to civil service posts without distinction except 
for operational reasons.120 Nevertheless, these ‘operational’ reasons long continued to be closely linked 
to stereotypes and prejudices.121 It was only with the Order of 21 April 1944 that women obtained the 
right to vote and not until the Law of 13 July 1965 that some equality was recognised in matrimonial 
regimes, although the preamble to the Constitution of 1946, which is still part of positive law, already 
specified that ‘[t]he law guarantees women equal rights to those of men in all spheres’.122 In short, the 
much vaunted doctrine of equality was not without major flaws.
Furthermore, it never prevented the introduction of numerous specific measures far beyond the historical 
purview of maternity protection. These included differences in the minimum age for access to employment 
and in the retirement age, exclusion from certain roles and from night work, specific rights to rest, jobs 
restricted to people of one sex or the other, separate schools and qualification systems – without these 
measures apparently being considered violations of the constitutional principle of equality. Some of the 
measures were associated with protecting women’s reproductive function, but many were related to so-
called ‘issues of decency’ and thus to stereotypes based on women’s supposed weakness. Incidentally, 
these restrictions were sometimes the result of demands made by men’s trade unions.123
Upholding equal rights: three French cases before the Court of Justice
It is only latterly, in the second half of the 20th century, that the principles of equality and non-
discrimination have enabled these measures to be challenged. In the first instance they were judged 
harshly. Except in cases where belonging to a particular sex is an essential condition for an activity (such 
as performing artists), they were gradually abolished or declared unlawful. There was no reflection – 
or very little – on the ‘positive’ aspect of the measures. The sole aim was formal equality. Gradually, 
the most obvious barriers disappeared – in law if not in reality – especially in relation to access to 
occupations. However, it is not easy to repeal protective measures without creating new inequalities. It is 
also interesting to examine the arguments of those who defended the measures, including some trade 
unions seeking to protect their beneficiaries from greater vulnerability.
A number of emblematic cases warrant attention. In terms of specific protective measures in collective 
agreements, the clauses establishing them, which clearly derogate from equality, were regulated but 
continued to be authorised by the law of 16 July 1983 on the rights and obligations of civil servants:124 
‘Any term reserving the benefit of any measure to employees on grounds of sex included in any collective 
labour agreement or labour contract shall be void, except where such a clause is intended to implement 
the provisions of Articles L. 122-25 to L. 122-27, L. 122-32 and L. 224-1 to L. 224-5 of this code’ 
(relating to protection of pregnancy and maternity).
119 The planned consitutional reforms, the discussion of which is currently postponed, removes ‘race’ and inserts ‘sex’ into this 
article.
120 CE, 3 juillet 1936, Dlle Bobard [Council of State, 3 July 1936, Miss Bobard]. 
121 Roman, D. (2018), ‘La promotion des femmes par la jurisprudence administrative in Actes du colloque « la juridiction 
administrative et les femmes »’ [‘The promotion of women through administrative case law, in conference proceedings, 
“Administrative jurisdiction and women”’], AJFP, p. 2215.
122 Ordonnance du 21 avril 1944 portant organisation des pouvoirs publics en France après la Libération [Order of 
21 April 1944 organising public authorities after the Liberation of France], Art. 17 and Loi portant réforme des régimes 
matrimoniaux, 13 juillet 1965, n° 65-570 [Law reforming matrimonial systems, 13 July 1965, n° 65-570].
123 Perrot, M. (1998), Les femmes ou les silences de l’Histoire [Women or the silences of history], Paris, Flammarion.
124 Loi dite ‘Loi Le Pors’ portant droits et obligations des fonctionnaires, 13 juillet 1983, n° 83-634 [Law on the rights and 
obligations of civil servants, 13 July 1983, n° 83-634].
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In 1988, France was referred to the CJEU because of the ‘special benefits’ accorded to women in 
collective agreements.125 For the French Government, the so-called ‘special benefits’ provision126 should 
be ‘considered compatible with the principle of equality when those special rights derive from a concern 
for protection. The French Government consider[ed] that the directive should be interpreted in the same 
manner, and that such an approach [wa]s supported by the provisions of Article 2 (3) and (4) [on specific 
protection for women, pregnancy and maternity and on positive action], of the directive. The French 
Government further consider[ed] that neither the directive nor the principle of equal treatment for men 
and women [wa]s intended to modify the organization of the family or the responsibilities actually 
assumed by the marriage partners. It claim[ed] that the special rights for women provided for in collective 
agreements [we]re designed to take account of the situation existing in the majority of French households. 
Member States, moreover, have a degree of discretion in that regard when implementing the directive’.127
In other words, according to France, the ‘special benefits’ at stake were compensation measures to take 
account of women’s de facto different social situation. No mention was made of any need to change this 
situation, the focus was purely on compensating for the consequences. Thus, ‘positive action’ was not 
invoked as such, the French reasoning merely defended the existence of a compensation measure deemed 
admissible because, France argued, the aim of the directive was not to transform gender relations in work 
and family life. This analysis was firmly rejected by the Court.128 The Court stated that, generally, there 
can be no derogations from the principle of equality under the guise of ‘removing existing inequalities’. 
Thereby it already made a distinction between compensation and positive action and, consequently, 
rejected the French position advocating general compensation measures. France’s reaction was not to 
abolish all special measures, but to restrict the scope by regulating collective negotiation. 
It is also interesting to look at another ‘French’ case from 1988.129 Traditionally, separate concours 
(recruitment competitions) were held for candidates seeking entry to different sections of the civil 
service.130 Thus, among others, there were different competitions for police officers and teachers. The 
justification given for this is interesting: for some sections (the police and prison officers) the contingencies 
of the role meant that it had to be restricted to a single sex. With regard to primary school teachers 
and physical education teachers, the French Government highlighted the need to give children the 
opportunity to be educated by men as well as women, since the profession was very female-dominated 
and the joint competitions were not enabling enough men to be recruited. The French Council of State 
approved this measure,131 holding that restricting women’s access in this way was justified, ‘taking into 
account the mission of the civil service in relation to pre-school and primary education and the potential 
125 C-312/86 Commission v France (1988).
126 Ibid, 8. The judgment of the CJEU specifies that, ‘According to the Commission, which has not been contradicted on 
this point by the French Government, special rights for women included in collective agreements relate in particular 
to: the extension of maternity leave; the shortening of working hours, for example for women over 59 years of age; the 
advancement of the retirement age; the obtaining of leave when a child is ill; the granting of additional days of annual 
leave in respect of each child; the granting of one day’s leave at the beginning of the school year; the granting of time off 
work on Mother’s Day; daily breaks for women working on keyboard equipment or employed as typists or switchboard 
operators; the granting of extra points for pension rights in respect of the second and subsequent children; and the 
payment of an allowance to mothers who have to meet the cost of nurseries or childminders’.
127 Ibid, 10-11.
128 Ibid. ‘It must be borne in mind that the principle of equal treatment which is to be implemented, under Article 5(2)(b) of 
the directive, with regard to collective labour agreements means, in the words of Article 2(1) of the directive, that “there 
shall be no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex”. Article 2(3) and (4) provides that the directive is to be without 
prejudice either to provisions concerning the protection of women, particularly as regards pregnancy and maternity, or 
to measures to promote equal opportunity for men and women, in particular by removing existing inequalities which 
affect women’s opportunities in the areas referred to in the directive. It must be concluded, both from the generality of the 
terms used in the French legislation, which allows any clause providing “special rights for women” to remain in force, and 
from the examples of such special rights which have been cited in the pleadings, that the contested provisions cannot find 
justification in Article 2(3). As some of those examples show, some of the special rights preserved relate to the protection 
of women in their capacity as older workers or parents – categories to which both men and women may equally belong.’
129 C-318/86 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [1988] EU:C:1988:352.
130 Within the civil service there are different sections or ‘corps’ of employees linked to a particular profession or field. For 
example: primary teachers or police officers.
131 CE, 16 avril 1986, n° 47337 [Council of State, 16 April 1986, n° 47337].
53
Positive action in practice: some dos and don’ts in the field of EU gender equality law
psychological benefit for children in this age group of having a teaching body composed of men and 
women’. The Commission did not share this analysis and referred France to the CJEU.132 During the 
course of the proceedings, teachers had been withdrawn from the list of civil service corps with separate 
concours, which le! the police, prison administration and a very specific teaching corps.133 Irrespective 
of the solution adopted by the Court judgment, which relates to the remaining corps, it is notable that 
the French Government’s argument already raised the issue of the beneficiaries of positive action. It was 
not an audible argument at the time, but we cannot be sure that it would still be the case today, as we 
shall see.
The third well-known French case is the Griesmar case134 which relates to increases to insurance duration 
for civil servants’ pensions. The legislation on retirement pensions for civil servants, considered similar to 
a payment under Article 119 of the EC Treaty then applicable, limited to female civil servants who have 
had children a service credit for the calculation of their retirement pension. Their pension was credited 
not because of a loss of entitlements resulting from maternity leave but because they had brought up 
children. Thus this measure excluded male civil servants from benefiting from this credit even if they 
had been responsible for their children’s upbringing. Here, again, the French Government defended the 
measure as a compensation measure, due to the incontestable fact that women’s careers entitle them 
to much lower pensions than men. Once again, the measure was too general to be justified. 
The Court noted that ‘[t]he measure in question [wa]s limited to granting female civil servants who are 
mothers a service credit at the date of their retirement, without providing a remedy for the problems 
which they may encounter in the course of their professional career.’ Following this judgment, fathers 
also obtained the service credit but, given the cost of this measure, a reform was deemed necessary. 
However, this reform, while it removed the increases, significantly penalised women who had, in fact, 
seen their careers curtailed. In terms of pensions, the issue was not about entitlements which could be 
exercised immediately but entitlements built up over a long period, meaning that a simple alignment 
could produce serious inequalities.135 Law 2004-1485 of 30 December 2004 preserved the automatic 
nature of the benefit for women, while men would have to provide proof of their involvement in caring 
for their children.136 The Leone judgment subsequently rejected this position, noting that ‘[u]nless it can 
be justified by objective factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex, such as a legitimate 
social policy aim, and is appropriate to achieve that aim and necessary in order to do so, which requires 
that it genuinely reflect a concern to attain that aim and be pursued in a consistent and systematic 
manner in the light thereof, a service credit scheme for pension purposes such as the one at issue in the 
main proceedings gives rise to indirect discrimination in terms of pay as between female workers and 
male workers’.137
Following this, in a judgment by the Assembly of 27 March 2015,138 the Conseil d’Etat considered that 
proof of the existence of a legitimate motive had been provided and approved the law reforming the 
pension system, noting furthermore that it had been amended again to remove the benefit for the 
future.139 This marked the end of this long-running dispute.
132 C-318/86 Commission v France (1988).
133 Ibid.
134 Griesmar (2001). 
135 Masse-Dessen, H. « Retraite des femmes: existe-t-il des marges de manœuvre du point de vue du droit communautaire sur 
la reconnaissance de droits particuliers? Interrogations et espoirs » [‘Women in retirement: is there room to maneouvre 
on the recognition of special rights from the point of view of Community law? Concerns and hopes’], Revue française des 
affaires sociales 2012/4, pp. 207-213, available at https://www.cairn.info/revue-francaise-des-affaires-sociales-2012-4-
page-207.htm accessed 20 September 2018.
136 Loi de finances rectificative pour 2004, 30 décembre 2004, n° 2004-1485 [Corrective financial law for 2004, 30 December 
2004, n° 2004-1485].
137 Leone and Leone (2014).
138 CE Ass., 27 mars 2015, M. Quintanel, n° 372426 [Council of State Assembly, 27 March 2015, no. 372426].
139 Loi portant réforme des retraites, 9 novembre 2010, n° 2010-1330 [Law reforming the pension system, 9 November 2010, 
n° 2010-1330].
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Introducing positive action into French law
This is the landscape in which the debate on positive action is taking place in France. On the domestic 
level, it is conceived as a derogation and intrinsically suspect. But designed as a compensation measure 
it is also essentially a social justice measure. Where does the balance lie? Is it possible to answer this 
question without defining positive action more specifically? We will consider a number of examples.
Firstly, since 1988 and with subsequent laws, the debate on ‘special measures’ has changed. It is now 
accepted that strict equality does not lead to justice and that voluntary, and therefore positive, action 
is required. Thus, the law has progressively established requirements in the private sector regarding 
the collection and publication of information about the state of equality between women and men, 
and regarding the negotiation and development of measures promoting professional equality within 
companies. Accordingly, Article L. 1142-4 of the Labour Code makes explicit provision for positive action 
in favour of women, although it specifies that such measures must be temporary.140 They are described 
as ‘measures adopted solely to benefit women with the aim of establishing equal opportunities for 
women and men, especially by removing existing inequalities which affect women’s opportunities’, 
and can take the form of (1) ‘regulatory provisions in the areas of recruitment, training, promotion, 
organisation and working conditions’, (2) ‘stipulations in extended industry-wide agreements or extended 
collective agreements’, and (3) ‘the application of the [so-called] strategy for professional equality for 
women and men’.141 The Law of 9 May 2001 promoting professional equality between women and 
men introduced the requirement to conduct collective negotiations on equality within companies, to 
produce written reports and to implement appropriate measures.142 In the different professional sectors, 
negotiations must now be conducted every three years.
The recent law of 5 September 2018 introduced a requirement for companies with over 50 employees to 
publish indicators annually on the pay gap between women and men and on the action taken to close the 
gap.143 The necessary procedures and a methodology are defined by decree and there is an obligation to 
conduct negotiations. If the indicators are unsatisfactory, companies must ensure compliance within three 
years or face penalties. The legal framework thus now allows and even imposes proactive measures. In 
the public sector, the Law of 12 March 2012 introduced similar measures.144
However, no text clearly defines the nature of the measures referred to by the Law of 5 September 
2018, Article L. 1142-4 of the Labour Code and the Law of 9 May 2001, which must only respect the 
general norms and, in particular, those which result from European law.145 Thus merely intending to 
establish an advantage for the disadvantaged group is not sufficient. This would be illegal, since it is not 
a ‘measure intended to protect pregnancy or maternity or to promote equal opportunity for men and 
women by removing existing inequalities which affect women’s opportunities’, especially in relation to 
employment.146
140 Code du Travail [Labour Code], Art. L 1142-4: The provisions of Articles L. 1142-1 and L. 1142-3 are without prejudice to the 
introduction of temporary measures adopted solely to benefit women with the aim of establishing equal opportunities 
for women and men, especially by removing existing inequalities which affect women’s opportunities. These measures 
result from: 1 regulatory provisions established in the areas of recruitment, training, promotion, organisation and working 
conditions; 2 stipulations in extended industry-wide agreements or extended collective agreements; 3 the application of 
the strategy for professional equality for women and men.
141 Ibid.
142 Loi relative à l’égalité professionnelle entre les femmes et les hommes, 9 mai 2001, n° 2001-397 [Law on professional 
equality between women and men, 9 May 2001, n° 2001-397].
143 Loi pour la liberté de choisir son avenir professionnel, 5 septembre 2018, n° 2018-771 [Law on the freedom to choose a 
professional future, 5 September 2018, n° 2018-771].
144 Loi relative à l’accès à l’emploi titulaire et à l’amélioration des conditions d’emploi des agents contractuels dans la fonction 
publique, à la lutte contre les discriminations et portant diverses dispositions relatives à la fonction publique, 12 mars 
2012, n° 2012-347 [Law on the access to permanent employment and the improvement of the working conditions of 
contractual agents in the civil service, on combating discrimination and on diverse provisions relating to the civil service, 
12 March 2012, n° 2012-347].
145 Ibid.
146 See Cass. Soc., 8 octobre 1996, n° 92-42.291 [Social Chamber of the Court of Cassation, 8 October 1996, n° 92-42.291].
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Secondly, the legality of compensation measures is still being debated in relation to pensions. Following 
the Griesmar judgments, the new law approving the use of the increases described above was validated 
by the French Constitutional Council.147 A!er the Leone judgment, the Conseil d’Etat approved the French 
provision in relation to the past, supporting its decision with a quantitative analysis of inequalities that 
penalise women’s careers. It did so through a very detailed statement which highlighted the differences 
between the incomes of women and men and the potential impact the removal of service credits would 
have for careers which were already completed.148 Specifically, while noting the divergence from the case 
law of the European Court, the Conseil d’Etat, according to its Vice President, sought to ‘establish the 
social facts from which the conclusions were to be drawn’.149
Thirdly, the debate on access to various branches of the civil service and on quotas has changed 
completely. As we have seen, on the basis of the Constitution any form of quota was initially prohibited. 
In 1982, the Constitutional Council declared the law proposing the introduction of quotas for women 
in municipal elections150 to be contrary to the Constitution, and this was followed in 2006 by a similar 
declaration on the law providing for specific proportions of men and women on the boards of directors 
and supervisory boards of private companies and public sector organisations, on works councils, among 
employee representatives, on lists of candidates for industrial tribunals and similar civil service bodies.151 
It took two constitutional revisions to clear the blockage. Since the constitutional laws of 8 July 1999 and 
23 July 2008, Article 1 of the Constitution no longer states only that France, ‘shall ensure the equality 
of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion’ and that ‘[i]t shall respect all 
beliefs’, but also that the law ‘shall promote equal access by women and men to elective offices and 
posts as well as to positions of professional and social responsibility’. On this basis, it was possible to 
introduce rules of parity and quotas, both for some political elections (European, regional, departmental 
and municipal, as well as for some of the seats in the Senate) and for recruitment panels and boards of 
companies and other bodies.
Nevertheless, resistance remains strong and, as Professor Diane Roman puts it,152 ‘although parity 
appears to have become a matrix for public policy, in administrative case law it still has the status of 
an exception which must be established by a legislative text and is strictly interpreted. This approach 
is readily explained by the administrative court’s unfailing adherence to the principle of formal equality 
which sees parity as a derogation from equality’. The Conseil d’Etat has thus repeatedly condemned 
measures introduced by lower authorities such as administrative or private regulations, which in contrast 
to the law voted for in Parliament, cannot derogate from the principle of equality. It has also condemned 
measures it considers to be too automatic which do not always allow selection panels to exercise freedom 
of choice or freely undertake an assessment of skills.
The fact that the provision in the Labour Code does not envisage parity, but a measure known as 
‘proportional diversity, which requires electoral lists for professional elections to reflect the composition 
of the electoral college, has been the subject of very strong opposition, including in some unions.153 
Recently, it even led to circumvention schemes requiring the intervention of a judge. Thus, to avoid this, 
some lists just present a single candidate of the under-represented sex.154 
147 Cons. Constit., 14 août 2003, n° 2003-483 DC, considérant 34 [Constitutional Council, 14 August 2003, no. 2003-483 DC 
recital 34].
148 CE Ass., 27 mars 2015, M. Quintanel, n° 372426 [Council of State Assembly, 27 March 2015, no. 372426].
149 Sauvé, J. M. (2018), ‘Allocution introductive du Colloque « la jurisprudence administrative et les femmes »’ [‘Introductory 
address at the conference “Administrative jurisprudence and women”], AJFP, p. 2212.
150 Cons. Constit., 18 novembre 1982, n° 82-146 DC [Constitutional Council, 18 November 1982, n° 82-146].
151 Cons. Constit., 16 mars 2006, n° 2006-533 DC [Constitutional Council, 16 March 2006, n° 2006-533 DC]. 
152 Roman, ‘The promotion of women through administrative case law’.
153 Code du Travail [Labour Code], Art. L. 2314-30 (former. L. 2314-24-1): ‘For each electoral college, the lists mentioned in Article 
L. 2314-29 which comprise several candidates are composed of a number of women and men corresponding to the proportion 
of women and men on the electoral roll. The lists are made up by alternating candidates of each sex until there are no more 
candidates of one of the sexes.’
154 Cass. Soc., 9 mai 2018, n° 17-14088 [Social Chamber of the Court of Cassation, 9 May 2018, n° 17-14088].
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On balance, it can be said at this point that, although the principle of parity has been accepted, it has not 
been greeted with widespread enthusiasm. Thus it can be concluded that the tradition of formal equality 
has had to be combined with the need for rules on positive action, but that the struggle is far from over.
Current debates
Without making any claims to be exhaustive, it could be useful to look at some current debates. Regarding 
the question of whether there is any need for positive action, the principle is still disputed.155 More 
specifically, the Vice President of the Conseil d’Etat, Jean Marc Sauvé, summarised the position of the 
administrative court as follows:156 ‘The promotion of real equality between women and men, particularly 
through the introduction of measures such as quotas or positive discrimination, is, as we well know, liable 
to have paradoxical consequences, which must lead us to think about imposing not a limit but a point 
of equilibrium for any policy of this kind. We must pursue two goals simultaneously: on the one hand, 
we must seek effective equality and the prohibition of discrimination, and, on the other, we must aim to 
preserve other principles which are part of the foundations of our social pact, such as equal entry into 
public employment by ability and without distinction except that of virtues and talents, and also respect 
for personal and religious freedom’.157 The issue must therefore be to define the content of this social 
pact and to establish to what extent, in the name of reality, we hold on to stereotypes. When statistics 
reveal a situation of inequality, how can we make the distinction between the stereotype which must be 
challenged and the social reality with which we are dealing? 
Furthermore, is it a question of ensuring equality for the individual beneficiaries or for the status of 
women in general and their image in society? Here we return to the debate which began in 1988 about 
diversity in teaching bodies. In terms of the suitability of the measure and specifically the avoidance 
of stereotypes, how should ‘positive’ be defined? It is not enough, we know, to assert that the action is 
positive, it must be shown that it leads to equality. This is an eminently political issue. 
A recent judgment from the Court of Cassation provides an example of this ambiguity.158 A collective 
agreement gave a half-day holiday to female employees to mark International Women’s Day on 8 March. 
This was clearly discrimination on the ground of sex. When a male employee asked to be entitled to 
the same benefit, the Court of Cassation adjudicated. Despite clearly contrary advice from its advocate 
general, it considered that this measure could be approved as positive discrimination. For the Court, 
‘by applying Articles L. 1142-4, L. 1143-1 and L. 1143-2 of the Labour Code,159 interpreted in the 
light of Article 157, paragraph 4, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, a collective 
agreement may include a half-day holiday only for female employees on the occasion of International 
Women’s Day, since this measure aims to establish equal opportunities for men and women by removing 
existing inequalities which affect opportunities for women’. The commentary on the judgment on the 
Court’s website explains that, ‘[e]vents of any kind on 8 March provide an opportunity for reflection on 
the particular situation of women at work and ways in which it may be improved. The Social Chamber 
considers that there is therefore a link between this day and working conditions which legitimises this 
measure established by a collective agreement to promote equal opportunities.’160
155 On 11 September 2011, during a radio broadcast, the Minister for European Affairs said that positive discrimination is 
‘completely contrary to the interests of women. If you are a woman who is appointed because you’re a woman, that will 
follow you throughout your life, throughout your career. That’s not how I want things to be’. Slate.fr, ‘Pour la ministre Nathalie 
Loiseau, imposer une femme à l’Assemblée est ‘contraire aux intérêts des femmes’’ 11 September 2018, available at 
http://www.slate.fr/story/167093/pour-la-ministre-nathalie-loiseau-la-discrimination-positive-est-contraire-aux-interets 
accessed on 20 September 2018.
156 Sauvé, ‘Allocution introductive du Colloque “La jurisprudence administrative et les femmes”’, p. 2212.
157 Ibid.
158 Cass. Soc., 12 juillet 2017, n° 15-26 262 [Social Chamber of the Court of Cassation, 12 July 2017, n° 15-26 262]. 
159 Articles on positive action and the possibility of implementing them through collective negotiation.
160 Cour de Cassation, ‘Explanatory note on Cass. Soc., 12 juillet 2017, n° 15-26 262’ available at https://www.courdecassation.
fr/jurisprudence_2/notes_explicatives_7002/droits_femmes_37306.html accessed on 20 September 2018.
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This analysis has been strongly criticised. As noted by Professor Jérôme Porta, ‘[t]he judgment of 12 July 
2017 undeniably marks a significant change. The benefit in question – the half-day holiday to which only 
female employees are entitled – has no link to protection of pregnancy or maternity or to the promotion 
of female employees in the company (where there was no suggestion that they were under-represented) 
or to a disadvantage specifically identified as one from which women within the company suffered. The 
solution is therefore technically questionable and it is no less dubious in terms of its symbolic value. 
Taking women away from the workplace, even by granting them a holiday, brings to mind a certain 
differentialist philosophy which long had the effect of excluding women from work, in the name of 
protecting them’.161 Would it be acceptable for positive action to encourage the campaign for women’s 
rights to be restricted to women? Whether this decision is in compliance with the legal principles of the 
Union is more than debatable.
V Conclusion
Are further conclusions necessary? The example given above shows that by not clarifying the concepts it 
is possible, under the guise of positive action, for the very purpose of and thereby our progress towards 
equality, to be called into question. An overstretched definition of positive action risks diluting its effects 
and leading to its purpose – equality – being forgotten. At the same time, a too restrictive definition risks 
leading to the inefficiency of positive action and the perpetuation of existing inequalities.
For the concept of positive action to be useful, it is essential to have a definition of the positive which 
does not perpetuate stereotypes. This would prevent the recurrence of those special advantages which 
only serve to uphold differences for which there is no objective basis. Ultimately, positive action is not 
compensation but a measure aimed at the future. The question is how to ensure that measures are 
‘devised’ in order to start building equality instead of being compensatory. Shouldn’t positive action be 
restricted to this strategy and achieved by envisaging the establishment of rights which are consistent 
with this approach? On this point, clarifications are necessary, even essential, if positive action is not to 
lose its positive role. The resistance found in some countries to the concept, for a variety of reasons, 
would surely be reduced if a clearer definition were to be given, establishing that it is not about static 
compensation or underpinning stereotypes, but about favouring a real level-playing field in order to 
make significant progress towards equality. Positive action is, a!er all, action and can therefore only be 
forward-looking. If equality had been achieved, it would be unnecessary. But it has not and so we need 
imagination… and diligence. We shall continue our work on this task – equality is an ongoing project. 
Despite alternating between setbacks and advances, we shall remain resolutely optimistic.
161 Porta, J. (2018) ‘Droit et genre, RÉGINE’, Recueil Dalloz, no. 17/7774, p. 919.
58
EUROPEAN EQUALITY LAW REVIEW – Issue 2 / 2018 
List of references
Case law of the CJEU
C-170/84 Bilka – Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz [1986] EU:C:1986:204.
C-312/86 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [1988] EU:C:1988:485.
C-312/86 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [1988], Opinion of AG Slynn, 
EU:C:1988:428.
C-318/86 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [1988] EU:C:1988:352.
Rapport d’audience présenté dans l’affaire C-312/86, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.
html?uri=cellar:be18ec45-d47e-4557-9e33-cfb510c6a337.0001.06/DOC_2&format=PDF.
C-450/93 Eckhard Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen [1995] EU:C:1995:322.
C-409/95 Helmut Marschall v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1997] EU:C:1997:533.
C-407/98 Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v Elisabet Fogelqvist [2000] EU:C:2000:367.
C-366/99 Joseph Griesmar v Ministre de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie and Ministre de la 
Fonction publique, de la Réforme de l’Etat et de la Décentralisation [2001] EU:C:2001:648.
C-319/03 Serge Briheche v Ministre de l’Intérieur, Ministre de l’Éducation nationale and Ministre de la 
Justice [2004] EU:C:2004:574.
C-476/99 H. Lommers v Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij [2002] EU:C:2002:183.
C-173/13 Maurice Leone and Blandine Leone v Garde des Sceaux, ministre de la Justice and Caisse 
nationale de retraite des agents des collectivités locales [2014] EU:C:2014:2090.
C-46/06 Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic [2008] EU:C:2008:618.
C-104/09 Pedro Manuel Roca Álvarez v Sesa Start España ETT SA [2010] EU:C:2010:561.
C-222/14 Konstantinos Maïstrellis v Ypourgos Dikaiosynis, Diafaneias kai Anthropinon Dikaiomaton 
[2015] EU:C:2015:473.
French case law
Cass. Soc., 8 octobre 1996, 92-42.291.
Cass. Soc., 12 juillet 2017, n° 15-26 262.
Cass. Soc., 9 mai 2018, n° 17-14088.
CE, 16 avril 1986, n° 47337.
CE, 3 juillet 1936, Dlle Bobard.
CE Ass., 27 mars 2015, M. Quintanel, n° 372426.
Cons. Constit., 18 novembre 1982, n° 82-146 DC.
Cons. Constit., 14 août 2003, n° 2003-483 DC.
Cons. Constit., 16 mars 2006, n° 2006-533 DC.
EU law and policy
Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men (2017), Opinion on “Gender balance in 
decisionmaking in politics”.
Council of the European Union (1976), Council Directive 76/207/ EC of 9 February 1976 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to 
employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions OJ L39/40.
Council of the European Union (1984), Council recommendation 84/635/EEC of 13 December 1984 on 
the promotion of positive action for women OJ L331/34.
59
Positive action in practice: some dos and don’ts in the field of EU gender equality law
Council of the European Union (2000), Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the 
principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin OJ L180/22.
Council of the European Union (2000), Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing 
a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation OJ L303/16.
De Vos, M. (2007), Beyond formal equality: Positive action under directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC.
Council of the European Union (2017), Progress Report of 31 May 2017 on the Proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving the gender balance among directors of 
companies listed on stock exchanges and related measures (2017) 2012/0299 (COD), 2 available 
at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9496-2017-INIT/en/pdf.
European Commission, International Women’s Day 2017: Gender equality – a European export (8 March 
2017).
European Commission (1996), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the interpretation of the judgment of the Court of Justice on 17 October 1995 in Case 
C-450/93, Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen COM(96) 88 final.
European Commission (2012), Proposal of 14 November 2012 for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on improving the gender balance among nonexecutive directors of companies 
listed on stock exchanges and related measures COM(2012) 614 final.
European Commission (2017), EU Action Plan 2017-2019 Tackling the gender pay gap COM(2017)678.
French law
Code du Travail, Art. L 1142-4; Art. L. 2314-30.
Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme (1789), Art. 1 and 6.
Ordonnance du 21 avril 1944 portant organisation des pouvoirs publics en France après la Libération, 
Art. 17.
Loi portant réforme des régimes matrimoniaux, 13 juillet 1965, n° 65-570.
Loi dite ‘Loi Le Pors’ portant droits et obligations des fonctionnaires, 13 juillet 1983, n° 83-634.
Loi relative à l’égalité professionnelle entre les femmes et les hommes, 9 mai 2001, n° 2001-397.
Loi de finances rectificative pour 2004, 30 décembre 2004, n° 2004-1485.
Loi portant réforme des retraites, 9 novembre 2010, n° 2010-1330.
Loi relative à l’accès à l’emploi titulaire et à l’amélioration des conditions d’emploi des agents contractuels 
dans la fonction publique, à la lutte contre les discriminations et portant diverses dispositions 
relatives à la fonction publique, 12 mars 2012, n° 2012-347.
Loi pour la liberté de choisir son avenir professionnel, 5 septembre 2018, n° 2018-771.
Reports
Aranjoš Borovac, E. (2018), Women and Men in Croatia 2018, available at https://www.dzs.hr/Hrv_Eng/
menandwomen/men_and_women_2018.pdf.
Ballester Pastor, M. A., Country report gender equality: Spain. How are EU rules transposed into national 
law? (forthcoming, 2018).
Bartolo, R., Country report gender equality: Malta. How are EU rules transposed into national law? 
(forthcoming, 2018).
Bodiroga-Vukobrat, N., Country report gender equality: Croatia. How are EU rules transposed into national 
law? (forthcoming, 2018).
Davulis, T. (2018), The Office of the Equal Opportunities’ Ombudsperson in Lithuania started campaign 
against possible discriminatory pricing of services for women and men, 24 July 2018.
Davulis, T., Country report gender equality: Lithuania. How are EU rules transposed into national law? 
(forthcoming, 2018).
60
EUROPEAN EQUALITY LAW REVIEW – Issue 2 / 2018 
De Vos M., Beyond formal equality: Positive action under directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC 
(European Network of legal experts in gender equality law, 2007).
Dupate, K., Country report gender equality: Latvia. How are EU rules transposed into national law? 
(forthcoming, 2018).
Efstratiou-Georgiades, E., Country report gender equality: Cyprus. How are EU rules transposed into 
national law? (forthcoming, 2018).
Equinet (2014), Positive action measures. The experience of equality bodies, European Network of 
Equality Bodies.
European Commission (2018), Report on equality between women and men in the EU, Publications Office 
of the European Union.
Ionescu, I., Country report gender equality: Romania. How are EU rules transposed into national law? 
(forthcoming, 2018).
Jacqmain, J., Country report gender equality: Belgium. How are EU rules transposed into national law? 
(forthcoming, 2018).
James, G., Country report gender equality: United Kingdom. How are EU rules transposed into national 
law? (forthcoming, 2018).
Jørgensen, S., Country report gender equality: Denmark. How are EU rules transposed into national law? 
(forthcoming, 2018).
Julén Votinius, J., Country report gender equality: Sweden. How are EU rules transposed into national law? 
(forthcoming, 2018).
Kerschen, N., Country report gender equality: Luxembourg. How are EU rules transposed into national 
law? (forthcoming, 2018).
Koderman Sever, T., Country report gender equality: Slovenia. How are EU rules transposed into national 
law? (forthcoming, 2018).
Koldinská, K., Country report gender equality: Czech Republic. How are EU rules transposed into national 
law? (forthcoming, 2018).
Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulos, S. and Petroglou, P., Country report gender equality: Greece. How are EU rules 
transposed into national law? (forthcoming, 2018).
Laas, A., Country report gender equality: Estonia. How are EU rules transposed into national law? 
(forthcoming, 2018).
Lembke, U., Country report gender equality: Germany. How are EU rules transposed into national law? 
(forthcoming, 2018).
Magurová, Z., Country report gender equality: Slovakia. How are EU rules transposed into national law? 
(forthcoming, 2018).
Meenan, F., Country report gender equality: Ireland. How are EU rules transposed into national law? 
(forthcoming, 2018).
Nacsa, B., Country report gender equality: Hungary. How are EU rules transposed into national law? 
(forthcoming, 2018).
Nousiainen, K., Country report gender equality: Finland. How are EU rules transposed into national law? 
(forthcoming, 2018).
Palma Ramalho, M. do R., Recent developments in Portuguese employment law regarding women on 
company boards, European Network of legal experts in gender equality law, 23 November 2017.
Palma Ramalho, M. do R., Country report gender equality: Portugal. How are EU rules transposed into 
national law? (forthcoming, 2018).
Renga, S., Country report gender equality: Italy. How are EU rules transposed into national law? 
(forthcoming, 2018).
61
Positive action in practice: some dos and don’ts in the field of EU gender equality law
Selanec, G. and Senden, L. (2011), Positive action measures to ensure full equality in practice between 
men and women, including on company boards, European Network of legal experts in gender 
equality law.
Senden, L. and Kruisinga, S. (2018), Gender-balanced company boards in Europe: A comparative analysis 
of the regulatory, policy and enforcement approaches in the EU and EEA Member States, European 
Network of legal experts in gender equality law.
Thomasberger, M. (2017), Austria enacts legislation for a 30 % quota of women on supervisory company 
boards, European Network of legal experts in gender equality law, 23 November 2017.
Thomasberger, M., Country report gender equality: Austria. How are EU rules transposed into national 
law? (forthcoming, 2018).
Timmer, A. and Senden, L. (2017), How are EU rules transposed into national law in 2017? A comparative 
analysis of gender equality law in Europe, European Network of legal experts in gender equality law.
van Hoof F. (2018), ‘Key developments at national level in legislation, case law and policy’, European 
Equality Law Review.
Vegter, M., Country report gender equality: The Netherlands. How are EU rules transposed into national 
law? (forthcoming, 2018).
Zielińska E, Country report gender equality: Poland. How are EU rules transposed into national law? 
(forthcoming, 2018).
Literature
Barmes, L., (2009), ‘Equality law and experimentation: The positive action challenge’ The Cambridge Law 
Journal, Vol. 68, p. 623.
Bennett, M., Roberts, S. and Davis, H., (2005), ‘The way forward — Positive discrimination or positive 
action?’ International Journal of Discrimination and the Law, Vol. 6, p. 223.
Bourdieu, P. (2001), Masculine domination, Stanford University Press.
Calvès G, La discrimination positive (Presses Universitaires de France 2016).
Cour de Cassation, ‘Explanatory note on Cass. Soc., 12 juillet 2017, n° 15-26 262’ (2017) available at 
https://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/notes_explicatives_7002/droits_femmes_37306.
html.
Craig, P. P. and De Búrca, G. (2015), EU law: text, cases, and materials, Sixth edition, Oxford University 
Press.
Cusack, S. and Pusey, L. (2013), ‘CEDAW and the rights to non-discrimination and equality’, Melbourne 
Journal of International Law. Vol. 14, p. 54.
Ellis, E. and Watson, P. (2013), EU anti-discrimination law, Oxford University Press.
Fredman S. (1998), ‘A!er Kalanke and Marschall: Affirming affirmative action’, Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies, Vol. 1, p. 199.
Fredman S. (2000), ‘Affirmative action and the European Court of Justice: A critical analysis’ in Shaw, J. 
(ed) Social law and policy in an evolving European Union, (1st edition), Hart Publishing.
Fredman S. (2003), ‘Beyond the dichotomy of formal and substantive equality: Towards a new definition 
of equal rights’ in Boerefijn, I. et al (eds), Temporary special measures: accelerating de facto equality 
of women under Article 4(1) UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Intersentia.
Fredman, S. (2009), Human rights transformed positive rights and positive duties, Oxford University 
Press.
Fredman, S. (2016), ‘Substantive equality revisited’ International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 14, 
p. 712.
Fredman, S. (2016), ‘Substantive equality revisited: A rejoinder to Catharine MacKinnon’, International 
Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 14, p. 747.
62
EUROPEAN EQUALITY LAW REVIEW – Issue 2 / 2018 
Holtmaat, R. (2012), ‘Article 5’ in Rudolf, B. et al (eds), The UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Discrimination against Women: a commentary, Oxford University Press.
Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulos, S. (2003) ‘Greece: From Formal to Substantive Gender Equality. The leading 
role of the jurisprudence and the contribution of women’s NGOs’ in Manganas, A. (2003) Essays in 
Honour of Alice Yotopoulos-Marangopoulos, Panteion University/Bruylant.
MacKinnon, C. A. (2016), ‘Substantive equality revisited: A reply to Sandra Fredman’, International Journal 
of Constitutional Law, Vol. 14, p. 739.
Masse-Dessen H, « Retraite des femmes : existe-t-il des marges de manœuvre du point de vue du droit 
communautaire sur la reconnaissance de droits particuliers ? Interrogations et espoirs », Revue 
française des affaires sociales 2012/4
McColgan, A. (2014), ‘Discrimination, equality and the law’, Human rights law in perspective, Vol. 19, Hart 
Publishing.
McCrudden, C. (1986), ‘Rethinking positive action’, Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 15, p. 219.
O’Cinneide, C. (2005), ‘Positive duties and gender equality’ International Journal of Discrimination and 
the Law, Vol. 8, p. 91.
O’Cinneide, C. (2006), ‘Positive action and the limits of existing law’ Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law, Vol. 13, p. 351.
Oliveira, Á. and Gondek, M. (2014), ‘Women on Company Boards – An Example of Positive Action in 
Europe’ EUI Working Papers, 2014/34, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.
Perrot, M. (1998), Les femmes ou les silences de l’Histoire, Flammarion.
Porta, J. (2018), ‘Droit et genre, RÉGINE’, Recueil Dalloz, Vol. 7774, n° 17, p. 919.
Roman, D. (2018) ‘La promotion des femmes par la jurisprudence administrative’ in Actes du colloque 
« la juridiction administrative et les femmes », AJFP.
Russell, M. and O’Cinneide, C. (2008), ‘Positive action to promote women in politics: Some European 
comparisons’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 52, p. 587.
Sauvé, J.M. (2018), ‘Allocution introductive du Colloque « la jurisprudence administrative et les femmes »’, 
AJFP.
Senden, L. A. J. and Visser, M. (2013), ‘Balancing a tightrope: The EU Directive on improving the gender 
balance among non-executive directors of boards of listed companies’, European Gender Equality 
Law Review. 
Slate.fr (2018), ‘Pour la ministre Nathalie Loiseau, imposer une femme à l’Assemblée est ‘contraire aux 
intérêts des femmes’’ 11 September 2018, available at http://www.slate.fr/story/167093/pour-la-
ministre-nathalie-loiseau-la-discrimination-positive-est-contraire-aux-interets.
Suk, J. C. (2012), ‘From antidiscrimination to equality: Stereotypes and the life cycle in the United States 
and Europe’, American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 60, p. 75.
Waddington, L. (2011), ‘Exploring the boundaries of positive action under EU law: A search for conceptual 
clarity’, Common Market Law Review, p. 1503.
